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ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY STRATEGIES:

FACTORS IN STATES'

DECISION MAKING

Harold W. Demone, Jr.,
Rutgers University and Margaret
Gibelman, The Council on Social Work Education.

ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the range of choices and factors affecting state
level decision making about how human services are to be delivered. In
light of the dual thrusts of decentralization and privatization, the
viability of public-private partnerships through contracting for services
is explored. Among the significant factors affecting decisions about alternative forms of service delivery are: political and fiscal preferences; the
strength of organized labor; the role and availability of the private service sector and history with purchase of service. The advantages and disadvantages attributed to a contracting model for delivering services are
unlikely to be argued from an empirical base. Rather, the relative influence
of various actors, ideologies and practices will affect states' decisions
about the scope and range of contracting and the degree to which there will
be reliance on the private sector.

With the passage of the Ominbus Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 95-35),
states and localities now have substantially increased authority and flexibility
to design their human service programs. Among the choices facing states is the
determination of how and to whom services will be delivered, methods of financing
services in light of decreased federal dollars, and the extent to which publicprivate partnerships in service delivery can and should be fostered. Although
the option to select among alternative service delivery arrangements is not new,
such issues have, heretofore, most frequently been debated at the federal level.
This paper explores some of the relevant issues and factors affecting state
decision making about strategies for delivering services, with particular attention to the viability of a contracting model between public and private organizations.
For this discussion, public agencies are defined as governmental, tax
supported agencies whose powers and duties are determined by statute and
administrative regulation.
Such agencies include state and local welfare
departments, youth and family service agencies, departments of mental health
and retardation, health departments, and other units of government often now
administered through an "umbrella" state human services agency and staffed
largely by civil service employees.

Private organizations are either for-profit or not-for-profit.
Those
of concern in this paper provide human services as a primary function under
the direction of a board of directors and are financed through profits, endowments, fees, direct or United Way contributions, and, to varying degrees, third
party payments, and government contracts and grants.
Non-profit organizations
include affiliates
of the Family Service Association of America and sectarian
agencies such as Catholic Charities.
Private for-profit organizations follow
the customary corporate or other proprietary provisions and are becoming increasingly invested in human services.
Activity areas include the nursing
home, general hospital, day care center,
and homemaker service provider.
There are several exchange routes between the public and private sectors.
In this paper we will focus on purchase of services which is one sub-heading
of a larger spectrum of arrangements pertaining to the transmission of public
funds to private bodies.
More precisely, purchase of service (POS) refers to
a set of organized procedures to bring public and private entities into
partnership for the acquisition of goods or services in the public interest.
Typically, a contract mechanism is used to actuate this arrangement between
two organizations.
Changing Policy Directions
The issue of choice about the manner in which services are delivered and
by whom (public or private) occurs within the context of evolving relationships
between the federal and state and local governments. President Reagan's
"New Federalism" has as its thrust the decentralization of decision making and
the dimunition of the federal government's role in determining the allocation
and use of funds at the state and local level. The proposition is that by
permitting states to choose their methods of delivering services, services can
be planned and implemented in a way that meets specific state circumstances and
needs.
The Reagan initiatives are, however, evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Revenue sharing, for example, was created during the Nixon Administration to
give localities broader discretion in speding federal funds than had previously
characterized federal social service programs.
In a 10 year period beginning
in 1972, $64.8 billion has been channeled to help pay for goods and services
(Pear, 1982).
What is different under the Reagan plan is the planned withdrawal of federal agencies from such fields as welfare, the reduction or
elimination of regulations governing the nature of human service programs,
and decreased federal responsibility for funding such programs,
These changes
significantly affect the magnitude of decisions to be debated at the state
and local level.
There is, however, only a limited menu from which states can select in
deciding on a service delivery strategy. States may elect to directly deliver
services under public auspices, purchase services from private sources, rely
on private sector initiatives, or combine direct and private delivery.
Ultimately, the selection of a service delivery plan will reflect the particular political
context affecting a state's
decision making process, and the
perceived feasibility of one approach over the others in terms of the organizational and fiscal resources available. Although ideologies of the left and
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right occasionally bear witness to some cause most public policy decisions
are made on a more pragmatic basis. The search is less for the ultimate
truth than for the decision which will help the elected official the most
and cost the least.
Decisions regarding methods of service delivery are very much influenced
by and interrelated with changing federal policy directions, including the
priority placed upon the use of the private marketplace and the reduced level
of government funding available for human services. This Administration would
like to see philanthropic and voluntary organizations assume major responsibility
for social welfare, an occurence most consider unlikely. For example, the
Independent Sector, a coalition of national voluntary organizations, corporations
and foundations, cautions that the Administration has "unrealistic expectations
for what private philanthropy can do "(Schmidt, 1982). To the extent possible,
state governments are compensating, at least in part, for some of the reduced
federal dollars, but states are experiencing their own, often severe, financial
problems.
A likely scenario is a continued public role (federal, state and
local) in financing services, with contracts and grants serving as the major
mechanism for the transfer of government funds to private organizations.
Private
organizations, in turn, will be expected to meet, in cash or kind, a proportion
of the administrative and operating social welfare costs.
The current emphasis on finding alternatives to purely public systems of
human services is consistent with the philosophy expounded by Drucker and Savas
who believe that virtually all governmental program functions should be "reprivatized" through delegating or contracting them out to autonomous private
or quasi-private institutions (Drucker, 1968: Savas, 1982). Partnerships between
the public and private sectors have also been stressed. President Reagan has
appointed a President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives to help meet
the social and economic needs of communities. According to Chairman C. William
Verity, Jr., local public-private partnerships will be encouraged to identify
important community needs, followed by a marshalling of human and financial
resources from the public and private sectors to meet those needs (Schmidt, 1982).
Fiscally, as well as philosophically, the use of purchase of service arrangements
fits
with recent alterations in government roles and priorities
and provides an
important option for states in patterning their service delivery systems.

Service Delivery Options
The extent to which state and local governments or private bodies should
be reponsible for human services delivery has varied within the larger
philosophical and political
shifts affecting American domestic policy.
Traditionally, the private sector has been the provider of choice, if not
always in practice, in large part due to the residual nature of government
services and the laissez-faire philosophy which has dominated government's
approach to human services policies and practice.
Long-standing perceptions
that the public agency is a "weak" service provider have encouraged the
formation of a "partnership" with the "more competent" private sector. The
use of purchase of service arrangements has also been affected by general social
forces which vary over time, including decentralization, subsidiarity, the growth
of government and associated costs, public employee unions, legthargy and
tradition, conflict of interest, and increased concern about productivity and
accountability.
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Wedel suggests the evolving practice of purchase of service has not relied
upon an organized body of theory, but has instead followed normative guidelines (Wedel, 1974).
As such, the availability of alternatives from which
units of government can select how services are to be delivered rests on
a series of interrelated propositions about the inadequacies of public
services and perceived improvements needed in human services policies and
programs.
The strength of these propositions will vary depending upon state
experiences, inter-organizational dynamics, and political preference. The
degree of influence and power wielded by the private sector will also affect
state decision making about service delivery mechanisms.
A number of factors have, in combination, encouraged states to opt for
purchase of service with for-profit and voluntary providers. Not all of these
factors are based on rational, considered processes, but financial considerations
are likely to be a powerful influence favoring POS (Tatara and Pettiford, 198h}.
Under the 1967 Amendment to the Social Security Act, public welfare agencies were
authorized to receive 75 percent federal reimbursement for service purchased
from private agencies, with the private sector often supplying the matching
25 percent. As a result, the scope of social service contracting at the State
level grew enormeusly, with estimates that over 50 percent of all public
services are now purchased (Pacific Consultants, 1979).
With the elimination
of many of the federal regulations governing purchase of service contracting,
states may now require that private agencies provide even a higher percent of
the match.
This "contribution" on the part of private agencies can be a powerful inducement to states to encourage the use of purchase source of purchase
of service arrangements.
Likewise, relying on the private sector as a primary
source of service meets public demands to limit the size of government bureaucracies and their expenditures. With the introduction of new treatment concepts,
the private sector has also been seen as more capable of responding to problems
of deinstitutionalization, normalization, and mainstreaming. And of course,
as always, interest group politics continues to operate.
The delegation of responsibilities and functions to the private sector
does, however, poses anew a series of political questions regarding the relationship between government and non-public systems. These issues are now being
debated in state capitols and the resolutions achieved will determine the extent
to which purchase of service maintains or increases its
status as a primary
method of service delivery. Such questions include:
-In what proportion should
public and private agencies have responsibility
for providing services?
-What systems of accountability can be instituted to insure the proper use
of public funds and the targeting of services to specific client populations?
-What method of service delivery is most cost effective?
-What sector can more effectively and efficiently deliver services?
,What role do public employee unions play in influencing a continued public
sector role?
-Do the advantages of contracting outweigh the liabilities of these
arrangements?
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Factors Influencing State Decision Making
Despite its long standing history, purchase of service continues to
stimulate debate. Theoretical, empirical and pragmatic themes and questions
about the efficacy and efficiency of P0S continued to be posed, frequently
couched in contrasting beliefs about the general role of government and its
specific responsibilities. To a lesser degree, concern also arises about
the impact of contracting on the voluntary, not-for-profit sector; here,
too, varying points of view are reflected. Fear of, and occasionally
antagonism to the private, for-profit sector are also at issue. Contrariwise there is another view which views the total organized not-for-profit
sector, public and private as equally incompetent. To varying degrees,
these historical issues regarding the use of P0S are stimulating discussion
in state legislatures and administrative agencies as decisions are made about
the best means to deliver services.
For the most part, both advocates and opponents of purchase of service
tend to be speculative, seldom arguing from an empirical base. Theory is tenuous. An advantage to one observer may be a disadvantage to another. The debate
about contracting centers on such themes as efficiency and effectiveness of
alternative service delivery approaches, accountability, client impact, cost,
appropriate auspices, standards and professionalism. Diagram I outlines some
of the frequently identified arguments for and against contracting. It should
be noted that, although the advantage seem to numerically outweigh the disadvantages, the cogency of each argument will vary. The numbers are not
relevant.
Some of the advantages and disadvantages are empirical, others are ideological.
Even some of the more pragmatic criteria
can be debated on value
based terms. For example, most studies come roughly to the same conclusion:
it is generally more efficient and productive for government to purchase goods
and services than to provide them on its own.
Thus, from the perspective of
state legislators and public administrators, the logical decision in a majority
of cases would be to purchase. Realities, however, often dictate otherwise.
In some jurisdictions, status, size of office, and even the quality of
furnishings for senior officials are tied directly to the number of employees
supervised.
Fewer employees could mean a smaller office, poorer furniture and
vinyl tile rather than carpeting. For elected officials, a reduction in
patronage is anticipated. Public employee unions fear loss of positions and
members. Such unions may be major financial contributors to state legislative
campaigns as well as some legislators' most loyal volunteers.
Similarly, they
or their family members may be politically active in local government.
Or,
vendors may be in short supply or may not desire a government contract.
Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of all of the arguments which
may enter the equation as to whether states and localities will purchase services
(Capoccia, 1978).
Instead, this discussion is limited to some of the more significant factors currently, or likely, to affect state and local decisions
about the manner in which human services will be delivered.
Cash/Vouchers. Conspicuously absent from most of the continuing arguments
posed about alternative service delivery mechanisms is the use of vouchers as a
responsible option to provide consumers the financial resources to buy needed
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services on the open market. (In recent decades each Federal administration
has explored the voucher philosophy. Since these initiatives are seldom
implemented voucher alternatives are seldom integrated into mainstream
debates about purchase of services). Vouchers can take the form of a coupon,
chip, or credit to be reimbursed for consumer expenditures.
Tuition tax
credits and deductions can also be applied.
These devices are all
instrumentalities to make government assistance individual centered rather than
institutionally based, thus effectively by passing the major human service
agencies as required "brokers." An appeal of this individually oriented form
of purchase of service is that it vastly reduces administrative and operating
expenditures, while optimizing "freedom of choice" for clients.
Experience with the use of vouchers is limited and observations are not
always grounded in empirical investigations. An attributed advantage of vouchers
is that they allow the application of private market remedies to serve public
policy objectives. They may have a beneficial impact on cost, efficiency and
economy, widen choice and diversity, and enhance accountability to the consumer.
On the other hand, drawbacks to voucher schemes include the limitation on
consumers' ability to make informed judgements, the reliance on marketplace
mechanisms in an environment of incomplete information, and the abdication of
reliance on professionalism and expert knowledge.
To date, most of the experience with vouchers has been in the field of
education, although third party reimbursement in the health industry has many
voucher characteristics.
Their enlarged use could stimulate the certification
of providers to maintain quality control, in which public and private agencies
could compete.
Voucher systems could probably not be easily applied to service
areas in which a regulatory/supervisory public justice function in involved,
such as child protective services, corrections and police protection.
In these
areas, the services delivered claim public uniqueness and could not be easily
left
to consumer choice.
Decentralization. The Federalist spirit
has abounded throughout our nation's
history, taking many forms.
More recently, President Johnson sometimes bypassed
state governments, going directly to local governments with funding and service
delivery responsibility. In addition, in 1966 block health grants to states
were enacted. Under the "Great Society", federal funds were allocated to
neighborhood groups which in turn organized themselves to influence governmental decision making.
Smith claims that this strategy was partly a response
to the societal conditions of the time, including a pervasive feeling of
estrangement from the powerful institutions of society and deep historic
tensions concerning race relations.
In his view, "the participatory contracts
are especially interesting because they illustrate
in extreme form the tendencies
implicit in the 'diffusion of sovereignty', the dispersion of power, the blurring
of the lines of authority, the breakdown of the public-private distinctions"
(Smith, 1971).
President Nixon explored decentralization by strengthening federal regional
offices and giving state and local governments more authority.
Revenue sharing
was enacted.
To President Reagan, the federal government was created by the
states.
Decision making, he believes, should occur at the local level where
He also talks about reinvigorating
officials best know local needs (Pear, 1982).
the private sector. Volunteerism has returned in spirit, if not in fact.
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Whatever the form for implementing a decentralized structure, the net
result of the combined rhetoric and actions by many presidents an4 echoed by
many governors is to reinforce pluralism and alternative structural models.
Revenue sharing and block grant programs have generally been received with
enthusiasm; governors and mayors welcome the reduced red tape and orders from
Washington.
Discontent at the state and local level with this structural mode
is aimed at the diminished federal dollars, not the concept. Purchase of
service is ideologically consistent with these preferences for decentralized
local decision making and has the added advantage of utilizing the expertise
of the local private sector.
Government Performance. Opinion polls, the source of much wisdom and
political action, document the increasing disenchantment of Americans with
their government.
The Harris Poll "Index of Alienation" asked a sample
population to respond to the statement: "The people running the country don't
really care what happens to you."
In 1966, 29 percent agreed with this statement, but by 1980 those in agreement reached 58 percent.
The comparable item
from the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, found trend
figures of 19 percent in 1964 and 60 percent in 1980 (Time, Feb. 23, 1981).
Another Harris poll (1973) found that the majority of respondents viewed public
employees as the "least productive in the country " (Serrin, W., 1981).
These
negative opinions about the performance of governmental agencies has stimulated
elected and administrative officials to search for alternatives.
The options
may be limited to finding ways to improve government performance or to circumvent the use of public agencies by enlarging the role of the private sector.
Here, again, purchase of service enters the equation as a viable means of
reducing government's role.
Government Size. Another matter of continuing presence at the federal,
state and local level is the constant lament about the size and growth of
government.
Typically, it is more complicated than promulgated. In respect
to absolute numbers of civilian employees, the federal government has remained remarkably stable for about twenty years.
The growth has been in
state and local government; consequently, attention to decreasing the size
of public bureaucracies is now increasingly directed to state capitols. In
regard to expenditures, government at all levels has grown, generally in
excess of inflation and increases in the Gross National Product.
Whatever the facts or complications, the size of government is a serious
target for many significant segments of our society. The sixty year boom in
public employment may have finally gtabilized (The Economist, November 22, 19751.
Options are more legitimated. To the extent that public opinion continues to
favor a decrease in the size of public bureaucracies, pressure will be exerted
on elected and appointed officials to explore alternative ways of producing
goods and services.
Organized Labor.
The position of public employee unions is unequivocal.
They oppose contracting public services and are mounting increasingly strident
objections to such practices. Picketing of private contractors is not uncommon.
Despite the size and importance of public employee unions, it seems unlikely
that the AFL-CIO, for one, will take an aggressive continuing organizational
stance against public purchase of services.
Many of their members belong to
unions affiliated
with private sector organizations receiving these same contracts.
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Also, in many cases the public employees loosing their positions are hired
by private organizations, often joining another union. In additionj most
human service employees, in private or public organizations, are not members
of organized labor. Thus the positions assumed by both advocates and opponents
of contracting are sometimes contrary to their own self-interest.
Last, but
perhaps most important, many of the major critics of public services are themselves members of organized labor.
The opposition of public employee unions, tempered as it is by the needs
of members to secure jobs in contracted programs, may not always be a critical
variable in states' decision making about methods of service delivery. The
cogency of their arguments will, of course, vary with the strength of unionism
in a particular locale and the extent to which purchasing services is perceived
as hurting or helping union members. The realistic concern with maintaining
or securing employment for union members in a time of 10 plus percent national
unemployment is likely to affect the position assumed by unions,
Conflict of Interest. Conflict of interest is an increasing concern. Such
conflict may mean a loss in quality to the consuer, as well as increased costs.
Conflict of interest may occur when the organizations responsible for providing
services also monitor, evaluate and account for such services as is often the
case for many large state agencies. The organizations responsible for the
allocation of funds also may be in a conflict of interest position when the
alternative is to continue funding their own operations or disperse funds to
non-public service providers.
Self-monitoring attributes are inherently limited
by self-interest, and decisions may not be achieved on objective criteria.
Americans distrust private monopolies, and public monopolies are no less sacred
as they suffer the same structural faults. But even more than trust; monitoring
of public organizations is ridden by conflict of interest.
The editor of the distinguished British journal, The Economist, suggests
"...
it has become increasingly clear the ownership of means of production is
no longer a source of political and economic power and may indeed now be a
source of political or economic powerlessness"
(The Economist, Nov. 22, 1975).
The editor concludes that governments' may have limited day-to-day control
over themselves. Direct control over employees can only be secured by passing
down instructions and this doesn't work when people resent being regarded as
subordinates. The Economist notes, in contrast, that it is relatively easy to
take action against subcontractors, taxpayers, or other outsiders by cutting
off orders or raising charges (The Economist, 1975). Public organizations
responsible for planning, budgeting, staffing, programming and evaluation, when
viable competition is lacking, are highly vulnerable to conflict of interest
charges, as in all vertical organizations. A logical means of addressing this
issue is to create a service delivery structure more amenable to control and
accountability.
Procurement and Assistance Programs. A continuing force at the federal
level has been presidentially-promulgated policy since 1955, through the Office
of Management and Budget, that the government rely on private sector contractors
to provide goods and services needed to act on the public's behalf cComptroller
General, 1981).
Basically, the position as later postulated in Circular A-76
has several components:
-Agencies may use military personnel, civilian employees, and contract
services to perform Federal activities;
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-Activities whereby 10 percent or more in personal savings can be
identified should be contracted; and
*Exceptions are selected with discretion. Examples are core functions of
government such as national defense, program priority selection and
controlling monetary transactions.
It is noteworthy that Congress has not overruled the policy although it
could do it by legislative or political
action.
In 1980 the Office of Management and Budget estimated that about 14 percent of all Federal employees were
still providing services that could,be contracted out under the terms of this
policy. This pro-contracting stance serves as a model for states, and at least
to some degree is followed. The message from Washington seems to be that purchasing services is a more desirable alternative, and when this option is
present, it should be pursued.
Shepsley uses as a criterion for public operation those matters in which
there is an "insufficient supply of public gooods and externalities."
in such
instances, there would be a "... prima facie case for the consideration of public
provision or regulation " Shepsley, K.W., 1980).
As examples, he uses national
highways, interstate highways and lighthouses. By inference, the use of private
sources to provide goods and services is justified in all instances when such
external alternatives are available.
Cost Data.
Several findings seam to occur consistently in research on
governmental functioning; among them, cost data are inadequate and understated
and it is usually found to be less expensive to contract out than to operate
services directly.
A typical example of inadequate information Is shown in a
1978 study by Savas and Associates of 315- municipal refuse collection systems.
Savas found that accounting costs varied, many costs were never included in the
refuse budget and, in conclusion, the actual costs
could not be calculated
(Saves, E.S., Stevens, B.J., Berenyi, E.B., 1978).
In respect to costs, the Department of Defense, which conducted over 300
comparison.studies using the 10 percent personnel savings factor noted above,
found in about 60 percent of the studies activities that it was more economical
to convert in-housi activities to contracts (Comptroller General, 19811.
Reprivatization.
Given the many influences, theory building and language
innovation is often stimulated,
Peter-Drucker a noted economist filled
the
gap in 1968 with his development of the theory of "reprivatization" now more
often called privatization. He described the esteem attributed to government
in the developed countties from the 1890s to 19 6 0s. But international disenchantment set in, Drucker believes.
Government is big, not strong; it is
flabby and fat; costs a great deal but achieves little. He suggests that
governments have lost control of their bureaucracies.
"It
can do only two
things well.
It can wage war,
It can inflate the economy " (Drucker, 1968, p. 217).
Drucker traces the etiology of this change in perception of government.
Too much was expected and disillusionment set in.
It was believed that governmental redistribution of wealth would solve economic problems that are noted
in inadequate productivity.
Another illusion was that by giving a task to
government "... conflict of decisions would be made to go away"
(Drucker, p. 215).
Government would be rational and unselfish and economic self interest would
disappear.
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To Drucker, government should be making the basic decisions. To govern
effectively, political energies need to be focused and issues identified and
dramatized. Fundamental choices must be clarified. But governing and doing
may be incompatible. Drucker urges decentralized functions, separating doing
from governing. Doing should be accomplished by non-governmental institutions
who would perform the operations. Government would serve as society's resource
for determining major objectives, and be a "conductor" of social diversity.
This need not mean "return to private ownership"
(Drucker, p. 234).
In Drucker's conception, government would be the logical body to make
choices about what services are to be delivered, who can best provide them, and
to whom they should be targeted. But government would not be the service
delivery source. Such functions would be left to private, autonomous institutions either of a for-profit or on occasion, the not-for-profit nature.
Drucker sees a society which allows institutions to do what they are best
equipped to do, including governing by government.
Future Directions
It is highly unlikely that state and local decisions about which needs are
most important, how services can best be delivered, and under whose auspices,
will be made as the result of a straight-forward need analysis and empirical
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of purchase of service as contrasted
with direct public delivery. Forecasting in this political environment is
replete with complexities. Many of the factors influencing decision making
about service delivery options have already been listed and some of the forces
at work described.
The major pressures to purchase include stimuli which will not easily
subside. It is usually less expensive and allows for more effective quality
control. Purchase is compatible with the desire to decentralize, which feeds
on large scale and increasing public discontent with governmental functioning
and performance and hostility to the bureaucracy. It reduces the public
monopolistic vertical organizational structure and is reinforced by the periodic
thrusts to "reprivatize" public functions. Changes in the 1981 Federal tax
laws are also favorable to selected new relations between governments and the
private sector. And each successful implementation facilitates additional
exchanges.
Those forces opposing the use of the private market, through purchase of
service, are also very powerful. Within the human services, recent dramatic
reductions in available federal and state dollars mean curtailment of some
services. It may be easier to reduce contracted programs than to decrease
governmental operations. Public service employee unions fear loss of members
and, depending on their strength, may engage in vigorous counter attack. Their
opposition is reinforced by the way Federal and some state and local governments
managed their reductions in force in 1981 and 1982. It was often inept,
extraordinarily complex, created organizational choas and so disrupted morale
that few senior bureaucrats want an early replay.
Also in opposition to purchase of service are concerned people in significant
positions in and out of government who hold strongly held ideological positions
about the proper role of government.
The gradual transfer of selected governmental
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operating programs
standing beliefs.
self interest.

to the private sector is not compatible with their longThese matters reflect honest matters of judgement, not

Perhaps most important in determining how states' human services will
be structured and delivered are factors of inertia, caution and self-interest.
These factors have long restrained major change in government and there is
no reason to believe that they are less powerful today.
Our governments are
not designed to accomodate to rapid social change or to deal effectively with
entrenched opposition. Despite the increased decision making powers of the
states within the human services realm, tradition and long standing practices
may play a particularly powerful role in determining the degree to which
patterns of service will be altered.
The net balance suggests selective growth in purchase of human service,
but at a slower rate than in the 1970s due to both increased resistance and
a decreased public investment in the human services. In the face of conflicting demands, choice will be difficult. Nevertheless, the decision to
purchase services from private vendors is consistent with the thrust to
redefine governmental functions and operations and form partnerships with
the non-public sector. No one doubts the government will continue to play
the important planning, development, financing and accountability roles,
but increasingly as an overseer rather than a doer likely through the
remainder of this century and into the next one.
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